DOMA and the Social Security Act: An Odd Couple Begetting Disfavored Children by Rains, Robert E.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 55 
Number 3 (Spring 2011) Article 4 
2011 
DOMA and the Social Security Act: An Odd Couple Begetting 
Disfavored Children 
Robert E. Rains 
The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, rer10@dsl.psu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Rains, DOMA and the Social Security Act: An Odd Couple Begetting Disfavored Children, 55 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol55/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
811 
DOMA AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: AN ODD COUPLE 
BEGETTING DISFAVORED CHILDREN 
ROBERT E. RAINS* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the shortest federal public laws in recent years, the 1996 Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA),1 appears to be clear and definite.  It has only two 
substantive provisions.  The first (Section 2 of DOMA), which has received the 
most attention, carves out an exception to full faith and credit2 by permitting 
states not to give effect to “any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any 
other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that 
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”3 
The second substantive provision provides in its entirety: 
  In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies 
of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.4 
This provision is something of an anomaly in federal law; normally the federal 
government defers to the states on such domestic relations matters as whether a 
couple is legally married for federal purposes.5  For example, to be eligible for 
Social Security survivors’ benefits, the claimant must have been validly 
married under state law.6  To be counted as a spouse for purposes of 
 
* Professor of Law, Director of Disability Law Clinic, Co-Director of Family Law Clinic, the 
Dickenson School of Law of Pennsylvania State University.  The author is a member of the 
Board of Directors of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants Representatives 
(NOSSCR), but the views expressed in this article are his own.  He wishes to thank his research 
assistant, Ujala Aftab, for her contributions to this project. 
 1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 4. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 5. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993). 
 6. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.345 (2008).  See also Everetts v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 
2000) (recognizing that the Social Security Act defers to state courts); accord Renshaw v. 
Heckler, 787 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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Supplemental Security Income (SSI), “you [must be] legally married under the 
laws of the State where your and his or her permanent home is (or was when 
you lived together).”7  Similarly, federal courts will generally apply state law 
to determine marital status for federal tax purposes.8  The same holds true for 
immigration purposes (outside of “sham marriages”).9  Federal courts will also 
look to state law to determine marital status for applicability of spousal 
privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.10 
Nevertheless, DOMA constitutes a mandate by Congress that the federal 
government not recognize same-sex marriages, even if valid in the state where 
they were entered into.11  Congress was initially concerned that the State of 
Hawaii might legalize same-sex marriage12 as a result of the then ongoing 
litigation in Baehr v. Lewin.13  As set forth in the House Judiciary Committee 
Report accompanying DOMA: 
  Recognition of same-sex “marriages” in Hawaii could also have profound 
implications for federal law as well.  The word “marriage” appears in more 
than 800 sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the word “spouse” 
appears more than 3,100 times.  With very limited exceptions, these terms are 
not defined in federal law. 
  With regard to the issue of same-sex “marriages,” federal reliance on state 
law definitions has not, of course, been at all problematic.  Until the Hawaii 
situation, there was never any reason to make explicit what has always been 
implicit—namely, that only heterosexual couples could get married.  And the 
Committee believes it can be stated with certainty that none of the federal 
statutes or regulations that use the words “marriage” or “spouse” were thought 
by even a single Member of Congress to refer to same-sex couples. 
  But if Hawaii does ultimately permit homosexuals to “marry,” that 
development could have profound practical implications for federal law.  For 
to the extent that federal law has simply accepted state law determinations of 
who is married, a redefinition of marriage in Hawaii to include homosexual 
 
 7. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1806(a)(1). 
 8. See, e.g., Lee v. Comm’r, 550 F.2d 1201, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 1977).  But note an 
exception to apply the “rule of validation” as recognized in Estate of Borax v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d 
666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring qualifying marriage for alien spouse to 
comply with laws of place where marriage occurred).  See also Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 
130, 132 (D.D.C. 1978) (recognizing the authority of the states, rather than the INS, to determine 
marriage validity outside of fraud). 
 10.  United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Panetta, 436 
F. Supp. 114, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 11. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 12. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. 
 13. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
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couples could make such couples eligible for a whole range of federal rights 
and benefits.14 
Ironically, while the Baehr litigation was pending, the voters in Hawaii 
amended the state constitution to bar same-sex marriages, so such marriages 
were never legalized there.15  However, at this writing,16 five states do permit 
same-sex couples to marry: Massachusetts (as of 2004);17 Connecticut 
(2008);18 Iowa (2009),19 Vermont (2009),20 and New Hampshire (enacted 
2009, effective 2010).21  On Dec. 18, 2009, Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian 
Fentry signed Bill 18-482, which legalized same-sex marriage in the District of 
Columbia effective March 2010,22 after Chief Justice John Roberts, acting as 
circuit justice for the District, refused to issue a stay.23  Additionally, 
California permitted same-sex couples to enter into marriage for approximately 
six months in 2008,24 during which there were approximately 18,000 such 
unions.25  California voters approved Proposition 8 in November 2008, 
banning such marriages, and, while the California Supreme Court subsequently 
upheld Proposition 8, it also ruled that interim California same-sex marriages 
remained valid.26 
Beyond the states that permit—or in the case of California, have 
temporarily permitted—same-sex couples to marry, there are two other groups 
of states whose laws in this area implicate DOMA and Social Security benefits.  
 
 14. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, pt. 4, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914 (citations 
omitted). 
 15. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 29371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *5–8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) 
(recognizing constitutional amendment abrogating Baehr v. Lewin). 
 16. April 2010. 
 17. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
 18. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 
 19. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009). 
 20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009).  See Vermont Lawmakers Enact Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill, 35 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1251 (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Vermont 
Lawmakers]. 
 21. An Act Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, 2009 N.H. Laws 60 (allowing 
persons to marry without regard to gender). 
 22. See Fate of Same-Sex Marriage in D.C. Rests in Hands of Congress, 36 Fam. L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 8, at 1095 (Dec. 22, 2009).  See also Marriage—Homosexuality—District of 
Columbia—Law Takes Effect, 36 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1215 (Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that 
several same sex couples married in D.C. the first day possible under changed law). 
 23. Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 130 S. Ct. 1279, 1280 (2010). 
 24. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). 
 25. California High Court Upholds Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN.COM, (May 27, 2009, 
8:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/26/california.same.sex.marriage/index.html. 
 26. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64, 119 (Cal. 2009).  Whether Proposition 8 passes 
federal muster is another question.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses). 
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First, there are those states that, while they do not permit same-sex couples to 
marry within their jurisdiction, will recognize the validity of a same-sex 
marriage entered into elsewhere.  New York State falls into this category.27  In 
May 2009, prior to allowing same-sex marriages to be performed there, the 
Washington, D.C. Council also voted to recognize same-sex marriages from 
other jurisdictions.28  In May 2010, the Maryland Department of Budget and 
Management announced that it was extending health benefits to the same-sex 
spouses of active and retired state employees who were married in another 
state.29 
Second, there are several states which permit same-sex couples to enter 
into variously named forms of legally recognized quasi-marriages.  In the 
midst of the Baehr v. Lewin litigation, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law in 
1997 allowing same-sex couples to become “reciprocal beneficiaries” with 
many of the “rights and benefits which are presently available only to married 
couples.”30  Similarly, Vermont created “civil unions” for same-sex couples in 
199931 after its supreme court ruled that denying such couples the benefits of 
marriage violated the state constitution.32  Vermont granted parties to civil 
unions “all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, 
whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common 
law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”33  
In 2009, when Vermont amended its marriage law to permit same-sex couples 
to marry, it also repealed the procedure for such couples to enter civil unions, 
allowed existing civil unions to continue, and allowed parties to civil unions to 
marry their civil union partners if they so chose.34  In 2004, New Jersey 
enacted its “Domestic Partnership Act,” permitting same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples to register as domestic partners and obtain some of the rights of 
married couples.35  In late 2006, New Jersey enacted a Civil Union Act, 
amending the 2004 Domestic Partnership Act.36  Under the Civil Union Act, 
 
 27. See Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009). 
 28. See Tim Craig, Uproar in D.C. as Same-Sex Marriage Gains, WASH. POST, May 6, 
2009, at A7. 
 29. Maryland Offers Health Benefits to Workers in Same-Sex Marriages from Other States, 
36 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1335 (May 25, 2010). 
 30. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1211.  This Act became effective July 1, 1997. 
 31. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72–73. 
 32. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).  But see Vermont Lawmakers Enact Same-
Sex Marriage Bill, 35 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1251 (Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing the later 
grant to same-sex couples of full marriage rights). 
 33. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 73 (codified with some differences in language at VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23 § 1204(a) (2009)). 
 34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009); Vermont Lawmakers, supra note 20, at 1251. 
 35. Domestic Partnership Act, 2003 N.J. Laws 1, 4. 
 36. Act of Dec. 21, 2006, 2006 N.J. Laws 1, 3–7 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–28 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (responding to Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)). 
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two eligible individuals of the same sex can enter a civil union and “receive the 
same benefits and protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as 
spouses in a marriage.”37 
It appears certain that the intention of Section 3 of DOMA was to deny 
federal marriage-based benefits to same-sex couples, or individual parties to 
same-sex couples, in state recognized marriages, reciprocal beneficiary 
relationships, civil unions, domestic partnerships, or any otherwise-labeled 
state legal status.38  What is far from clear is the effect, if any, of DOMA on 
federal benefits for children born or adopted into such legal relationships.  The 
language from the House Judiciary Committee Report,39 expresses a concern 
that if Hawaii permitted homosexuals to marry, this “could make such couples 
eligible for a whole range of federal rights and benefits.”40  In a later section, 
entitled “H.R. 3396 Advances the Government’s Interest in Preserving Scarce 
Government Resources,” the report is even more explicit, but again, only 
regarding couples, not their children: 
[I]f Hawaii (or some other State) were to permit homosexuals to “marry,” 
these marital benefits would, absent some legislative response, presumably 
have to be made available to homosexual couples and surviving spouses of 
homosexual “marriages” on the same terms as they are now available to 
opposite-sex married couples and spouses.  To deny federal recognition to 
same-sex “marriages” will thus preserve scarce government resources, surely a 
legitimate government purpose.41 
Likewise, in his Signing Statement for DOMA, President Clinton made 
clear his understanding that Section 3 addressed only federal benefits for 
“spouses” in same-sex relationships: 
  I have long opposed governmental recognition of same-gender marriages 
and this legislation is consistent with that position.  The act confirms the right 
of each State to determine its own policy with respect to same-gender marriage 
and clarifies for purposes of Federal law the operative meaning of the terms 
“marriage” and “spouse.” 
  This legislation does not reach beyond those two provisions.42 
While preserving scarce government resources is admittedly a legitimate 
government purpose,43 the discretion to grant benefits to some but not to others 
 
 37. N.J. STAT. § 37:1–29 (2007).  See also id. § 37:1–31 (detailing the rights and 
responsibilities of civil union couples). 
 38. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 31 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2935. 
 39. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 40. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914. 
 41. Id. at 18, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922. 
 42. Presidential Statement on Same-Gender Marriage, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1829, 
1830 (Sept. 20, 1996). 
 43. See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986). 
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cannot be “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of 
judgment.”44 
The legality of denying federal benefits to state recognized same-sex 
spouses is, however, increasingly being challenged.  February 2009, Ninth 
Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhart issued an order in In re Levenson, directing 
that Mr. Levinson’s same-sex California spouse be added to Levenson’s 
federal health, dental and vision benefits.45  The benefits-plan administrator 
had denied Levenson’s request to add his spouse—made three days after they 
were legally married in California.46  Judge Reinhart found that the application 
of DOMA to deny benefits to Mr. Levenson’s same-sex spouse violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not “survive even 
rational basis review.”47  Regarding the government interest in preserving 
scarce resources, Judge Reinhart opined: 
The denial of health insurance to same-sex spouses may in a comparatively 
few cases relieve the government of paying its portion of a family coverage 
premium.  However, that a government policy incidentally saves the 
government an insignificant amount of money does not provide a rational basis 
for that policy if the policy is, as a cost-saving measure, drastically 
underinclusive, let alone founded upon a prohibited or arbitrary ground.  That 
rule applies here: There is no rational relationship between the sex of an 
employee’s spouse and the government’s desire to limit its employee health 
insurance outlays; the government could save far more money using other 
measures, such as by eliminating coverage for all spouses; and the application 
of DOMA in this context sometimes saves the government no money at all.48 
When Levenson’s same-sex spouse was still not enrolled in his health care 
plan after several months because the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
prevented his enrollment, Judge Reinhart entered a subsequent order directing 
the office of the Federal Public Defender for the Central District of California 
to pay Levenson a monetary award under the Back Pay Act in an amount equal 
to the wrongfully denied benefits.49 
In March 2009, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts directly 
challenging the legality of DOMA’s provision denying federal benefits to 
 
 44. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619, 640 (1937)). 
 45. In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 46. Id. at 1146. 
 47. Id. at 1149. 
 48. Id. at 1150–51 (citations omitted). 
 49. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 937 (9th Cir. 2009).  Ninth Circuit Chief Justice Alex 
Kozinski entered similar orders on behalf of a staff attorney, Karen Golinski, who had legally 
married her same-sex partner in California.  In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).  
Judge Kozinski, however, avoided a direct constitutional challenge to DOMA.  Id. at 958. 
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same-sex couples married under state law.50  The court found that “DOMA 
fail[ed] to pass constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational 
basis test.”51  In so finding, the court explained that neither Congress’s 
rationales52 nor the government’s justifications53 for DOMA established a 
rational relationship between the classification of “marriage” or “spouse” to a 
legitimate governmental objective.54  As a result, the court held that DOMA 
was in violation of “core constitutional principles of equal protection”55 and it 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.56 
In June 2009, President Obama signed a Presidential Memorandum 
requesting an increase in benefits to same-sex domestic partners of federal 
employees: 
  For civil service employees, domestic partners of federal employees can be 
added to the long-term care insurance program; supervisors can also be 
required to allow employees to use their sick leave to take care of domestic 
partners and non-biological, non-adopted children.  For foreign service 
employees, a number of benefits were identified, including the use of medical 
facilities at posts abroad, medical evacuation from posts abroad, and inclusion 
in family size for housing allocations.57 
In July 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the U.S. 
Departments of Health and Human Services and Veterans Affairs and the 
United States of America, asserting that DOMA “interferes with the 
Commonwealth’s sovereign authority to define and regulate marriage” and 
“constitutes an overreaching and discriminatory federal law.”58  The complaint 
cited, among other detriments to same-sex couples, the denial of spousal Social 
Security benefits.59  Addressing the claim that DOMA conserves scarce 
government resources, the complaint alleged: 
 
 50. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 51. Id. at 387. 
 52. The court listed the purported rationales: “(1) encouraging responsible procreation and 
child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) 
defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.”  Id. at 388. 
 53. The government’s rationale included “preserving the status quo.”  Id. at 390. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
 56. Id. at 397. 
 57. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Presidential Memorandum on Fed. 
Benefits & Non-Discrimination (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Fact-Sheet-Presidential-Memorandum-on-Federal-Benefits-and-Non-Discrimination.  
See also Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 22, 2009). 
 58. Complaint at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 
234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156-JLT). 
 59. Id. at 12. 
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  DOMA was also enacted for the purported purpose of preserving federal 
resources by denying benefits and entitlements to married individuals in same-
sex relationships who would qualify for such benefits if they were in a 
different-sex relationship.  The Congressional Budget Office, however, has 
estimated that, if marriages between same-sex couples were recognized in all 
fifty states and by the federal government, the federal budget would benefit by 
$500 million to $900 million annually.  This net benefit is due to estimated 
increased revenues through income and estate taxes and decreased outlays for 
Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and Medicare.60 
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, and found DOMA 
unconstitutional on a number of grounds.61  The court found that DOMA, by 
violating the Equal Protection Clause, “impose[d] an unconstitutional 
restriction on the receipt of federal funding.”62  Additionally, by defining 
marriage in DOMA, Congress “encroache[d] upon the firmly entrenched 
province of the state” and thereby ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment.63 
The focus on DOMA’s consequences for same-sex couples, while certainly 
understandable, obscures the effect on the already tangled law governing 
derivative Social Security benefits for children of wage-earners.  This article 
will first set forth the complex rules for determining who is the dependent child 
of an insured wage earner.  It then examines the inconsistent application of 
those rules to cases involving children conceived using the frozen sperm of 
their deceased fathers.  This article next addresses the difficult issues that have 
arisen in the family law context regarding the legal status of a same-sex 
couple’s child who is not the biological or adoptive child of one member of 
that couple, and, against that background, analyzes DOMA’s ramifications on 
the non-biological, non-adoptive child of one member of a same-sex couple 
who dies or becomes eligible for Social Security benefits.  Finally, the article 
will enunciate a set of basic principles and specific child-oriented reforms to 
end the disadvantages faced by certain children of non-traditional families in 
securing needed Social Security benefits. 
I.  BACKGROUND: WHO IS THE DEPENDENT CHILD OF AN INSURED WAGE 
EARNER? 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides monthly benefits, 
commonly known as Child’s Insurance Benefits, to the dependent child of an 
insured wage earner (an insured) who is disabled, retired, or deceased.64  In the 
 
 60. Id. at 10–11 (citations omitted). 
 61. Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 
2010). 
 62. Id. at 248. 
 63. Id. at 253. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006). 
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ordinary course of events, there is no question as to who is the child of an 
insured wage earner.  But as in family law, particularly where parents are not, 
or were not, married to each other, the SSA may be called upon to adjudicate 
legal parenthood as a predicate to a child’s receipt of derivative—also known 
as auxiliary—benefits.65  And, as in family law, a child may in some 
circumstances be deemed not to be a person’s legal child for Social Security 
purposes—even though she is that person’s biological child.66 
The Social Security Act contains complex rules for determining who is an 
insured’s child67 and when the child is dependent upon a wage-earner.68  A 
child under the Social Security Act, includes the “child or legally adopted child 
of an individual,” and, in some circumstances, a stepchild or grandchild of an 
individual.69  The SSA’s regulations impose further requirements (or 
clarifications, depending on one’s point of view) for determining who is an 
individual’s child.70  As with the rules governing who is married, these rules 
significantly defer to state law.71  A child is the natural child of an insured 
wage earner if any one of the following conditions is met: 
1. “[The child] could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her 
natural child under State inheritance laws . . .”72 
2. “[The child is] the insured’s natural child and the . . . [child’s] mother 
or father went through a ceremony which would have resulted in a 
valid marriage between them except for a ‘legal impediment’ [that 
prevented the marriage from being valid.]”73  Such a legal impediment 
will be found if the couple married in good faith, but one of them was 
unknowingly still married to someone else at the time of the 
ceremony74 or a “defect in the procedure followed.”75 
 
 65. See id. § 416(h). 
 66. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e). 
 68. Id. § 402(d). 
 69. Id. § 416(e). 
 70. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.354–404.358 (2009). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 404.355(a)(1).  The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of inconsistent opinions 
in cases challenging state intestacy laws regarding children born out of wedlock.  Compare 
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537–40 (1971) (holding that Louisiana intestacy laws 
precluding illegitimate children from inheritance rights of legitimate children were not in 
contravention of due process or equal protection clauses), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
776 (1977) (holding that Illinois probate act classifying child inheritance rights based on 
illegitimacy denied equal protection), and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (holding that a 
New York statute requiring filiation order for illegitimate children to inherit from father did not 
violate equal protection). 
 73. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(2). 
 74. Id. § 404.346(a).  There is considerable and conflicting state law on successive 
marriages.  Compare Chandler v. Cent. Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 654 (Kan. 1993) (finding that 
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3. “[The child is] the insured’s natural child and [the child’s] mother or 
father has not married the insured, but the insured has either 
acknowledged in writing . . . [that the child is his], been decreed by a 
court to be [the child’s] father or mother, or been ordered by a court to 
contribute to [child] support.”76  However, “[i]f the insured is deceased, 
the acknowledgement, court decree, or court order must have been 
made or issued before his or her death.”77 
4. Where the child’s biological parent has not married the insured, and the 
child cannot furnish evidence of an acknowledgement, court decree or 
court order, the child may produce other evidence to demonstrate his or 
her status as the child of the insured.  However, in this circumstance, 
the child must also “show that the insured was either living with [the 
child] or contributing to [the child’s] support at the time [the child] 
applied for benefits,” or, “if the insured [was] not alive at the time . . . 
[the child] must have evidence to show that the insured was either 
living with . . . or contributing to [the child’s] support” at the time the 
insured died.78 
Under certain circumstances, a legally adopted child may be awarded 
benefits as the child of the insured.79  Again, the SSA looks to the law of the 
state (or foreign country if the adoption took place there) to determine the 
validity of an adoption.80  Likewise, under certain circumstances, a stepchild 
may receive benefits if, after his or her birth, the natural or adopting parent 
married the insured.81  The SSA will look to state law to determine the validity 
of the marriage,82 unless of course, it is a same-sex marriage which DOMA 
prevents the SSA from recognizing.83  In limited circumstances, benefits may 
 
burden is on spouse from earlier marriage to overcome presumption of validity of later marriage), 
with Estate of Henry, 353 A.2d 812, 813–14 (Pa. 1976) (finding that “presumption of continuance 
of prior marriage prevails unless facts are shown which have the effect of overcoming this 
presumption”). 
 75. 20 C.F.R. § 404.346(a).  Compare Accounts Mgmt., Inc. v. Litchfield, 576 N.W.2d 233, 
235 (S.D. 1998) (holding that failure to record marriage license did not render marriage void), 
with Ravenal v. Ravenal, 338 N.Y.S.2d 324, 328 (1972) (holding that marriage ceremony 
performed by someone other than a clergyman or minister rendered such marriage void). 
 76. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(3).  What will constitute a legally acceptable acknowledgment of 
paternity may be a contentious issue.  See, e.g., Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266–67. 
 77. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(3).  For an extreme example of a paternity order entered decades 
after the father’s death, see Harris v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 767 So. 2d 181 (Miss. 
2000). 
 78. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(4). 
 79. Id. § 404.356. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. § 404.357. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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also be available to an insured’s grandchild or step-grandchild,84 or equitably 
adopted child.85 
For each of these categories of children, there are somewhat different rules 
for determining dependency on the insured, which is a necessary element for 
receipt of benefits.86  The following section of this article discusses cases 
involving children conceived after the death of their father, illustrating the 
difficulties inherent in applying state law to federal benefits, especially where 
state and federal statutes simply do not address new reproductive technologies.  
These cases also provide the necessary background for understanding how 
DOMA may harm children brought into non-traditional families in non-
traditional ways. 
II.  THE SSA AND CHILDREN CONCEIVED AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARENT 
A. Judith Hart (Louisiana) 
A decade before enactment of DOMA, advances in artificial reproductive 
technology already presented challenges to the SSA in applying the Social 
Security Act to situations which Congress had surely not envisioned when it 
drafted the relevant statutory language.  The first such case to draw national 
publicity was that of Judith Hart, the biological child of Nancy Young Hart and 
Edward W. Hart Jr.87  Judith was conceived by gamete intrafallopian transfer 
three months after her father’s death.88  The Harts had been married for four 
years, a time during which they tried unsuccessfully to conceive.89  In 1990, 
Edward was diagnosed with esophageal cancer.90  After receiving the 
diagnosis, but before starting chemotherapy, Edward had a sperm sample taken 
and frozen for the specific purpose of having Nancy later impregnated with his 
child.91  Edward died within a few months, and, after his death, Nancy utilized 
 
 84. 20 C.F.R. § 404.358. 
 85. Id. § 404.359. 
 86. Id. §§ 404.360–404.365. 
 87. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security 
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 251 (1999).  
See also Mark Curriden, A Dad for Judith Hart: Judge Says Child Eligible for Benefits, A.B.A. J., 
Aug. 1995, at 30, 30 [hereinafter Curriden, A Dad for Judith Hart]; Mark Curriden, No Benefits 
for “Miracle” Baby: Suit by Artificially Inseminated Mother Seeks Reversal, A.B.A. J., Mar. 
1995, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Curriden, No Benefits]; Joseph Wharton, “Miracle” Baby Denied 
Benefits, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 38, 38 [hereinafter Wharton, Miracle Baby]; Joseph Wharton, 
Social Security Case Settled, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 40, 40 [hereinafter Wharton, Social 
Security]. 
 88. Banks, supra note 87, at 251. 
 89. Curriden, No Benefits, supra note 87, at 18. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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the frozen sperm.92  Judith was the happy result, born on June 4, 1991, ten days 
short of a year after Edward’s death.93  Under the law of Louisiana (Judith’s 
state of birth), Judith was considered to be an illegitimate child because she 
was born more than 300 days after the dissolution of her parents’ marriage 
caused by her father’s death.94  As an illegitimate child, Judith had to prove 
filiation within one year of the death of her father; but Nancy was unable to file 
within the statute of limitations because she was recovering from childbirth 
and had not yet received a birth certificate for Judith.95  Also, under 
Louisiana’s laws, Judith did not qualify as an heir of her father for intestacy 
purposes.96  Furthermore, Judith could not show that Edward had 
acknowledged her, prior to his death, as his biological daughter.97 
In 1992, Nancy Hart applied to the SSA for Judith to receive survivor’s 
benefits on Edward’s account.98  The SSA rejected her claims.99  A Social 
Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) subsequently reversed the denial and 
directed that Judith, and therefore Nancy, receive survivor’s benefits.100  
Unfortunately for Judith, the SSA’s Appeals Council reopened the case on its 
own motion101 and reversed the ALJ, thus reinstating the SSA’s denial of 
benefits.102  Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Nancy Hart filed 
suit on behalf of Judith in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana.103  However, that court never issued a ruling on Judith’s 
status as the child of Edward Hart for SSA purposes.  Rather, in March 1996, 
the Commissioner of the SSA, Shirley Chater, moved for a voluntary remand, 
announcing that the SSA would pay Judith survivor’s benefits.104  In so doing, 
Commissioner Chater stated: 
This case raises significant policy issues that were not contemplated when the 
Social Security Act was passed many years ago. . . . Resolving these 
significant policy issues should involve the executive and legislative branches, 
rather than the courts.105 
 
 92. Banks, supra note 87, at 251; Curriden, No Benefits, supra note 87, at 18. 
 93. Banks, supra note 87, at 251–52. 
 94. Id. at 252. 
 95. Id.  It is, of course, possible that Nancy was simply unaware of the ten-day limitation she 
faced or that she was overwhelmed by the events surrounding childbirth.  See id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 253. 
 98. Banks, supra note 87, at 251–52. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 254. 
 101. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (2009); Banks, supra note 87, at 254. 
 102. Banks, supra note 87, at 254. 
 103. Id. at 255. 
 104. Id. at 255–56; Wharton, Social Security, supra note 87, at 40. 
 105. Wharton, Social Security, supra note 87, at 40. 
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As will be seen, more than a decade later, the legislative and executive 
branches have not resolved those issues, and by default they continue to be 
adjudicated by the courts under a statute that SSA admits was not drafted in 
contemplation of those issues.106  Not only has Congress failed to update the 
Social Security Act to address modern reproductive technologies, but the 
states, by-and-large, have generally failed to make adjustments in their laws.107  
Nor have subsequent Social Security commissioners acted so generously 
toward children conceived by non-traditional methods, as did Commissioner 
Chater.  The result has been a definite “mixed bag” for such children. 
B. Amanda and Elyse Kolacy (New Jersey) 
In a case tragically similar to that of the Hart family, Mariantonia and 
William Kolacy were a young married coupled in New Jersey trying to 
conceive when William was diagnosed in 1994 with leukemia.108  William 
provided two sperm samples, which Mariantonia banked.109  Despite 
chemotherapy, William died in 1995 at the age of 26.110  Almost exactly a year 
later, in accordance with her late husband’s wishes,111 Mariantonia used his 
sperm and her eggs at Cornell’s infertility clinic to create embryos that were 
implanted in her.112  The result was the birth of Amanda and Elyse Kolacy in 
November 1996, more than 18 months after their father’s death.113  Thereafter, 
Mariantonia applied to the SSA for dependent child benefits for Amanda and 
Elyse on William’s account.114 
The SSA denied the twins’ claim, and a Social Security ALJ affirmed that 
denial in a written opinion in November 1999.115  Mariantonia then brought 
suit in New Jersey state court seeking a declaratory judgment that Amanda and 
Elyse have the status of William’s intestate heirs.116  Because Mariantonia 
asserted, inter alia, that the New Jersey Parentage Act was unconstitutional, 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Robert E. Rains, What the Erie “Surrogate Triplets” Can Teach State Legislatures 
About the Need to Enact Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2008). 
 108. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1263. 
 112. Id. at 1258. 
 113. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258. 
 114. Id. at 1259. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1258. 
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the New Jersey Attorney General appeared to defend the statute.117  Neither the 
SSA nor its Commissioner was a party to the proceedings.118 
Unlike the Hart case, the Kolacy case proceeded to a decision on the 
merits.  Judge Stanton recognized that there was no New Jersey precedent 
governing whether a child conceived after the death of her biological father, 
and born more than 18 months after his death, is his legal heir.119  The New 
Jersey Statute provided in relevant part: “Relatives of the decedent conceived 
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the 
lifetime of the decedent.”120  Mirroring the Commissioner of the SSA’s 
comments about the Social Security Act, Judge Stanton acknowledged that the 
New Jersey legislature “was not giving any thought whatever to th[is] kind of 
problem” when it enacted the intestacy provision.121  While recognizing “[i]t 
would undoubtedly be useful for the Legislature to [address] . . . the issues 
presented by reproductive technology,” Judge Stanton nevertheless declined 
the state attorney general’s invitation to abstain from deciding the case on the 
merits.122  The judge likewise declined Mariantonia’s invitation to hold the 
statute unconstitutional.123  Rather, Judge Stanton reasoned that the intent of 
the law was to include children—such as the twins—where it was clear that 
they were the biological children of the deceased parent and that the deceased 
parent had “unequivocally expressed his desire that [the mother] use his stored 
sperm after his death to bear his children.”124 
I discern a basic legislative intent to enable children to take property from their 
parents and through their parents from parental relatives.  Although the 
Legislature has not dealt with the kind of issue presented by children such as 
Amanda and Elyse, it has manifested a general intent that the children of a 
decedent should be amply provided for with respect to property passing from 
him or through him as the result of a death.  It is my view that the general 
intent should prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of statutes which did not 
consciously purport to deal with the kind of problem before us.125 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258. 
 119. Id. at 1260. 
 120. Id. (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B: 5-8).  After the decision in Kolacy, the New Jersey 
legislature amended this section on “after born heirs” to read as follows: “An individual in 
gestation at a particular time is treated as living at the time if the individual lives 120 hours or 
more after birth.”  2004 N.J. Laws 1442 (codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:5-8 (2004)).  Under 
this test, Amanda and Elyse were “living” less than eighteen months after William’s death. 
 121. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1260. 
 124. Id. at 1262–63. 
 125. Id. at 1262. 
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Accordingly, Amanda and Elyse were the legal heirs of William Kolacy under 
the intestacy laws of New Jersey.126  Given that conclusion by the New Jersey 
court, this would make Amanda and Elyse entitled to survivor’s benefits as the 
dependent children of the wage-earner, William.127 
C. The Woodward Twins (Massachusetts) 
In another case eerily similar to the fact patterns in Hart and Kolacy, 
Lauren Woodward and her husband, Warren, were a childless couple in 
Massachusetts when he was diagnosed with leukemia in January 1993.128  The 
Woodwards banked Warren’s sperm and he then underwent a bone marrow 
transplant.129  Nevertheless, Warren died in October 1993, and Lauren was 
appointed the administratrix of his estate.130  Subsequently, Lauren 
successfully conceived using Warren’s stored sperm and later gave birth to 
twin girls in October 1995.131 
In January 1996, Lauren applied to the SSA for children’s benefits for the 
twins and mother’s benefits for herself, as survivors of the wage-earner, 
Warren.132  The SSA rejected these claims on the grounds that the twins were 
not Warren’s children under the Social Security Act.133 
In February 1996, while pursuing her appeals within the Social Security 
administrative system, Lauren filed an action in the state Probate and Family 
Court “for correction of birth record.”134  Acting in dual capacities as: 1) 
wife/mother and 2) administratrix of the estate, Lauren filed a stipulation of 
“voluntary acknowledgement of parentage.”135  Based on this stipulation, the 
Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity and an order to amend 
both birth certificates declaring the deceased Warren to be the twins’ father.136 
Notwithstanding the judgment of paternity and amended birth certificates, 
a Social Security ALJ affirmed the denial of benefits, finding that the 
Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws precluded the twins’ inheritance 
from Warren.137  After the SSA’s Appeals Council denied review, Lauren filed 
a complaint seeking judicial review in the United States District Court for the 
 
 126. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263–64. 
 127. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355(a)(1), 404.361(a). 
 128. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 260–61. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 261. 
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District of Massachusetts.138  That court certified the following question to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC): 
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from the 
husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and the woman is 
impregnated with that sperm after the man, her husband, has died, will children 
resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of natural children 
under Massachusetts’ law of intestate succession?139 
To this question the Massachusetts SJC responded with a “definite maybe.”140  
The court rejected both Lauren’s position that posthumously conceived 
children must always be allowed to inherit from their biological parent by 
virtue of their genetic connection and the SSA’s position that such children can 
never inherit because they were not “in being” prior to the parent’s death.141  
The court noted that the Massachusetts intestacy statute, unlike those of 
Louisiana and North Dakota, has no requirement that a successor must exist at 
the death of the decedent.142 
The court recognized that the case implicates three important State 
interests: the best interests of children, the orderly administration of estates, 
and the reproductive rights of the deceased genetic parent.143  Clearly it is in 
the best interest of posthumously conceived children to receive monetary 
support from their parents’ estates.144  However, such rights necessarily 
conflict with the rights of the deceased’s other children.145  The intestacy 
statute promotes the orderly administration of estates by requiring “certainty of 
filiation” and creating limitation periods for actions against the intestate 
estate.146  Because death of one spouse necessarily terminates a marriage, 
“posthumously conceived children are always nonmarital.”147  Although the 
Massachusetts intestacy laws have a one-year period for commencing paternity 
claims, the certified question did not include the timeliness of the twins’ 
claims.148 
Regarding the state’s interests to honor the reproductive choices of 
individuals, the court concluded that “donor parent must clearly and 
 
 138. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 261. 
 139. Id. at 259. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 262. 
 142. Id. at 264 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 939 (West 2000); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. 14-18-04 (Michie 1997)).  The Louisiana statute, effective July 1, 1999, was not in 
existence at the time of the birth of Judith Hall.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 143. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265–68. 
 144. Id. at 265. 
 145. Id. at 266. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 266–67. 
 148. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 267–68. 
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unequivocally consent not only to posthumous reproduction but also to the 
support of any resulting child.”149  Despite using the language “clearly and 
unequivocally,” the court explicitly declined to explicate “what proof would be 
sufficient.”150  Indeed, it seems unlikely that a young man under a death 
sentence of terminal illness, trying to make it possible for his wife to carry his 
child after his death, would ordinarily be making explicit plans to support such 
a child from the next world.  And, even though there is a certain logic to the 
court’s conclusion that such a child is non-marital if conceived after the death 
of the father, both husband and wife might well assume to the contrary—if 
they thought about the matter at all. 
The SJC thus found that mere genetics are not sufficient to establish legal 
parentage and left the question to the district court for further evaluation after 
Mrs. Woodward presented evidence of Warren’s intent.151  Finally, the SJC 
rebuked the Probate and Family Court judge for entering the paternity 
judgment and amending the twins’ birth certificates without giving notice to 
every other interested party, including potential heirs.152 
D. Juliet and Piers Netting (Arizona) 
In yet another case with starkly similar facts, Rhonda Gillett-Netting filed 
a claim for survivor’s benefits for her twins, Juliet and Piers Netting.153  
Rhonda and Robert were a married couple in Arizona, trying to conceive, 
when he was diagnosed with cancer in December 1994.154  He delayed the start 
of therapy in order to deposit his sperm, which was cryogenically preserved.155  
Despite chemotherapy, Robert died on February 4, 1995.156  Before he died, 
Robert confirmed that he wanted Rhonda to have his child using his frozen 
sperm.157  Rhonda underwent in vitro fertilization in December 1995, and gave 
birth to the twins on August 6, 1996.158 
 
 149. Id. at 269. 
 150. Id. at 270. 
 151. Id. at 271.  In this regard, the Massachusetts SJC misconceived the function of a federal 
district court reviewing a denial of Social Security benefits.  The reviewing federal court does not 
take additional evidence.  See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004).  It 
only reviews the administrative record made below.  Id.  If the record is incomplete, it may 
remand the case and “order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social 
Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is 
good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.”  42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). 
 152. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 271. 
 153. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 595. 
 158. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
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In one potentially significant regard, this case was factually different from 
the three preceding ones.  Robert, who was 59 years old at the time of his 
marriage to Rhonda in 1993, had three children from a prior marriage.159 
Rhonda filed for children’s benefits for the twins in August 1996 based on 
Robert’s earnings record, and the SSA rejected that claim.160  At the third 
administrative level, a Social Security ALJ ruled that the twins were not 
dependent on Robert, because, “the last possible time to determine dependents 
[sic] on the wage earner’s account is the date of the death of the wage 
earner.”161  After losing the claim before the SSA’s Appeals Council, Rhonda 
filed for judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona.162  She asserted that the twins were Robert’s surviving, dependent 
children, and that denying them that status violated their equal protection 
rights.163  District Court Judge Roll rejected these claims.164 
First, Judge Roll reasoned that one’s biological children are not necessarily 
one’s “children” for purposes of the Social Security Act.165  He linked being 
the child of a wage-earner with the ability to inherit from the wage-earner 
under the state’s intestacy laws.166  As Judge Roll interpreted Arizona’s 
intestacy laws, the twins could not inherit since they were neither born nor in 
gestation when Robert died.167  Although this conclusion foreclosed benefits 
under the Social Security Act, Judge Roll went on to address whether the twins 
were dependent upon Robert.168  He acknowledged that the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Mathews v. Lucas,169 “a child who is legitimate . . . is 
considered to have been dependent at the time of the parent’s death,” 170 and 
 
 159. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963–64 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d, 371 
F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 160. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 964. 
 164. Id. at 967. 
 165. Id. at 965. 
 166. Id. at 965. 
 167. Id. (interpreting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108). 
 168. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 169. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 499–500 (1976). 
 170. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (quoting Lucas, 427 U.S. at 499–500).  In Lucas, 
the Supreme Court upheld—against an equal protection challenge—the Social Security Act’s 
requirement that certain illegitimate children show that the deceased wage earner was their parent 
and, at the time of his death, was living with those children or contributing to their support.  
Lucas, 427 U.S. at 515–16 (1976). 
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that “Arizona law treats all children as legitimate by statute.”171  Nevertheless, 
he concluded that the twins were not dependent on Robert.172 
Finally, applying the rational basis test, Judge Roll concluded that denying 
the twins dependent child status and hence survivors’ benefits did not violate 
their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.173  
Relying on Lucas, he found that the Social Security Act’s “purpose in 
providing survivor’s benefits . . . is to replace the unanticipated lost support 
resulting from the decedent’s death.”174  He reasoned that since Robert died 
before the twins were conceived, they suffered no unanticipated lost support.175 
It is, frankly, difficult to perceive where Judge Roll found the requirement 
that the loss of income be unanticipated.  The passage in the Lucas decision to 
which Judge Roll refers does not support such a requirement.  Rather, the 
Court in Lucas cited the “legislative history [which] indicat[ed] that the statute 
was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise ‘approved’ 
children of deceased insureds, but was intended just ‘to replace the support lost 
by a child when his father . . . dies.’”176  Based on this legislative history, the 
Lucas Court concluded: “Taking this explanation at face value, we think it 
clear that conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not 
impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom 
the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need.”177 
Judge Roll’s requirement that a loss of parental income be unanticipated 
simply does not withstand scrutiny.  If a woman purposefully were to get 
pregnant by her terminally ill husband, knowing he was not even expected to 
live to see the child born, the resulting child would unquestionably be entitled 
to survivor’s benefits if the father was an insured wage-earner.178  Additionally 
a wage earner who has already stopped working and is receiving Social 
 
 171. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-601). 
 172. Id. at 967 (determining that the Arizona statute was meant to address the legitimacy 
children born to unwed couples and did not apply to the case at bar). 
 173. Id. at 970. 
 174. Id. (citing Lucas, 427 U.S. at 507). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 507 (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-404, pt. 10 (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2050). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355, 404.361(a) (2010). 
 [T]he primary purpose of [Social Security child’s benefits] is to provide support for 
dependents of a disabled wage earner. . . . Under [the Social Security Administration’s] 
view the Act’s purpose would be to replace only that support enjoyed prior to the onset of 
disability; no child would be eligible to receive benefits unless the child had experienced 
actual support from the wage earner prior to the disability, and no child born after the 
onset of the wage earner’s disability would be allowed to recover.  We do not read the 
statute as supporting that view of its purpose. 
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974). 
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Security Disability Insurance benefits can have a child who is immediately 
eligible for child’s benefits on that parent’s account.179  In either of these 
situations, benefits are payable even though there was nothing unanticipated 
about the parent’s loss of income.  Indeed, had Rhonda conceived using 
Robert’s preserved sperm the day before he died, the resulting child 
unquestionably would have been an eligible survivor. 
In a rather brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed.180  As had prior courts, 
the Ninth Circuit noted that “[d]eveloping reproductive technology has 
outpaced federal and state laws.”181  Neither the Social Security Act nor 
Arizona family law clarified the twins’ status.182  Nevertheless, by virtue of the 
fact that the twins were Robert’s biological children and their paternity was 
undisputed, they were his children under the Social Security Act for purposes 
of survivor’s benefits.183  Furthermore, because all children under Arizona 
family law are deemed to be legitimate and the Social Security Act equates 
legitimacy with dependency, the twins were Robert’s dependent children.184  
As Robert’s dependent children, they were statutorily entitled to survivor’s 
benefits, which rendered their equal protection claim moot.185 
It is worthwhile to pause here and note a critical distinction between 
Arizona law and Massachusetts’s law.  In Woodward, the Massachusetts SJC 
had been clear that the Woodward twins were “nonmarital” children because 
they were conceived after their father’s death.186  In Gillett-Netting, the Ninth 
Circuit found that those twins were “legitimate” under Arizona law.187  The 
Gillett-Netting Court never addressed whether the twins were marital or 
nonmarital children.  Nevertheless, in a footnote, the court suggested that if a 
sperm donor had not been married to the mother, a resulting child would have 
to show actual dependency on the sperm donor father to be entitled to 
survivor’s benefits on his earnings record.188  Hence, implicitly at least, the 
Ninth Circuit deemed the Gillett-Netting twins to be marital children.189 
 
 179. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a) (2010). 
 180. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 181. Id. at 595. 
 182. Id. at 595–96. 
 183. Id. at 597. 
 184. Id. at 598. 
 185. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594 n.1. 
 186. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Mass. 2002). 
 187. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598. 
 188. Id. at 599 n.7. 
 189. In response to Gillett-Netting, the SSA issued an acquiescence ruling, AR 05-1(9), that 
applies only to the Ninth Circuit.  SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).  
SSA noted its disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, but directed its adjudicators within 
that circuit as follows: 
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E. Robert Stephen (Florida) 
Robert Stephen was the posthumously conceived child of Floridians 
Michelle Stephen and her deceased husband Gar Stephen.190  Michelle and 
Gar’s marriage was short-lived; they wed on October 25, 1997, and he died of 
a heart attack on November 17, 1997.191  The following day, Michelle “had 
Gar’s sperm extracted from his deceased body and cryo-preserved.”192  There 
was no indication that Gar had pre-approved the post-mortem extraction of his 
sperm, nor that he left a will.193 
Michelle became pregnant after multiple fruitless attempts at in vitro 
fertilization, and gave birth to Robert on June 20, 2001.194  Michelle and Gar 
were listed as Robert’s parents on his birth certificate.195 
In April 2002, Michelle filed an application with the SSA for Robert to 
receive surviving child’s benefits on Gar’s account.196  The SSA turned down 
this claim both initially and on reconsideration; at the third administrative 
level, an ALJ affirmed the denial.197  Applying Florida law, the ALJ reasoned 
that Robert was not Gar’s dependent child as he could not inherit from Gar 
 
insured’s “child” for purposes of the Act.  We will not apply section 216(h) of the Act in 
determining the child’s status.  In addition, if such child is considered legitimate under 
State law, we will consider the child to be the insured’s “legitimate” child and thus 
deemed dependent upon the insured for purposes of section 202(d)(3) of the Act.  All of 
the States and jurisdictions within the Ninth Circuit, except Guam, have eliminated 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children.  These States allow all children 
the same rights which flow between parents and their children, regardless of the parents’ 
marital status.  A child acquires these rights if he establishes that an individual is his 
parent under State family law provisions.  Accordingly, if all other requirements are met, 
adjudicators will consider such child entitled to child’s benefits under section 202(d). 
Id. at 55,657. 
 190. Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  This is reminiscent of the famous English case of Diane Blood.  Regina v. Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology Auth. (Ex Parte Blood), [1999] Fam. 151 (Eng.).  After Diane’s 
husband, Stephen, contracted meningitis, doctors removed two sperm samples from his comatose 
body by “electro-ejaculation.”  Id. at 172.  Stephen Blood, who had never given consent for the 
extraction of his sperm, died shortly thereafter.  Id. at 172–73.  Britain’s Human Fertilisation [sic] 
and Embryology Authority prevented Diane Blood from using the sperm to impregnate herself in 
Britain, but she ultimately won the right under the European Community Treaty to take the sperm 
to Belgium where she was treated and had two successful pregnancies.  See Diane Blood 
Pregnant Again, BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2002, 9:39 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
england/1809296.stm. 
 193. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
 194. Id. at 1259. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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under Florida’s law of intestate succession,198 and Gar had not provided for 
Robert in a will.199  The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s decision, and 
Michelle appealed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida.200 
The district court conceded that under Florida law, Robert was Gar’s 
genetic and legitimate child.201  But, those conclusions did not necessitate that 
Robert be Gar’s child under the Social Security Act, so as to be eligible to 
receive survivor’s benefits.202  The court concluded that Robert was not 
dependent upon Gar at the time of Gar’s death.203  The court noted that Robert 
was not born until three years after Gar died.204  Further, the court found that 
Robert was not even Gar’s child within the meaning of the Social Security Act; 
as a posthumously conceived child, he was not eligible to make a claim against 
Gar’s estate absent such provision in a will.205  The court observed that “this 
case would have been more difficult had Gar left a will that provided for ‘any 
child of mine’ or ‘any issue of mine’ without defining ‘child’ or ‘issue.’”206 
Finally, the court distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gillett-
Netting.207  Whereas Gillett-Netting had been decided under Arizona law, 
which did not deal specifically with posthumously conceived children, Florida 
law did specifically address such children.208  The pertinent section of Florida 
law provided: 
A child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died 
before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body 
shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child 
has been provided for by the decedent’s will.209 
In the absence of a will executed by Gar, Robert had no claim against Gar’s 
estate under Florida law. 
 
 198. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (enacted May 14, 1993, effective May 15, 1993, 
as amended 1998)). 
 202. Id. at 1264–65. 
 203. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.  The Social Security Act requires that the child be 
dependent at the time of the insured’s death.  42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C). 
 204. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1265 n.10. 
 207. Id. at 1265 (citing Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 208. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (1998)). 
 209. FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2005). 
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F. Christine Khabbaz (New Hampshire) 
Donna Eng and Rumzi Khabbaz married in 1989 and had a son six years 
later.210  In April 1997, Rumzi was diagnosed with a terminal illness and began 
to bank his sperm so that Donna might be able to conceive another child by 
him.211  Indeed, he executed a consent form to that effect, stating his “desire 
and intent to be legally recognized as the father of the child to the fullest extent 
allowable by law.”212  Rumzi died in May 1998.213  One year later, Donna 
conceived using his banked sperm.214  She gave birth to Christine Rumzi in the 
summer of 2000.215 
Donna applied to the SSA for survivor’s benefits for Christine, but the 
SSA denied that claim.216  After losing at all administrative levels, Donna 
sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire: “Is a child conceived after her father’s death via artificial 
insemination eligible to inherit from her father as his surviving issue under 
New Hampshire intestacy law?”217 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court responded in the negative.218  As 
framed by that court, the key question under New Hampshire’s laws governing 
estate distribution was whether Christine was Rumzi’s “surviving issue.”219  
The court looked to the dictionary definition of “surviving” as meaning 
“remaining alive or in existence.”220  Since Christine was neither alive nor in 
existence when Rumzi died, she was not his “surviving issue.”221  Donna’s 
alternative arguments for bringing Christine under New Hampshire’s estate-
distribution laws were unpersuasive to the court, which expressed its concern 
that making estates wait for the potential birth of a posthumously conceived 
child would wreak havoc with the statutory scheme.222  In contradistinction to 
Massachusetts law as articulated in Woodward,223 New Hampshire law deemed 
 
 210. Khabbaz v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 1183. 
 220. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1183–84 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2303 (2002)). 
 221. Id. at 1184. 
 222. Id. (finding the scheme designed to determine “surviving issue” could not function 
where banked sperm could create additional issue after death). 
 223. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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that Christine’s parents were “not ‘unwed’” despite the fact that Rumzi was 
dead when Christine was conceived; thus, she was the child of married parents 
and was not illegitimate.224  As in Massachusetts, the New Hampshire justices 
called on the state legislature to study and address the complex questions 
surrounding new reproductive technologies.225 
After the New Hampshire Supreme Court handed down its decision, the 
parties stipulated in the federal court action to the entry of judgment in favor of 
the Commissioner.226 
G. Baby Boy Finley (Arkansas) 
Amy and Wade Finley, Jr. married in October 1990.227  They pursued 
fertility treatments at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, and, in 
June 2001, doctors produced ten embryos using their gametes.228  Two 
embryos were implanted into Amy, but she later had a miscarriage.229  Four 
were frozen for preservation.230  In July 2001, Wade died intestate in 
Arkansas.231  In June 2002, Amy was implanted with two of the remaining 
embryos, resulting in a single pregnancy.232  She gave birth to a boy on March 
4, 2003, roughly twenty months after Wade’s death.233  A few weeks before 
the child was born, Amy obtained an order from the Lonoke County Circuit 
Court that, upon the baby’s delivery: 
[T]he State Registrar of the Arkansas Department of Health, Division of Vital 
Records, shall enter and state upon the certificate of birth that Wade W. Finley, 
Jr., now deceased, is the father of [W.F.]; [a]nd that, thereafter, all State and 
Federal Agencies, of the United States of America, shall uphold the findings of 
this Court’s conclusion of paternity—in [Plaintiff] the mother and Wade W. 
Finley, Jr. the father—for any and all lawful purposes; and, that [W.F.] is the 
legitimate child of [Plaintiff] and Wade W. Finley, Jr. for any and all lawful 
purposes.234 
A month after the birth of the child, Amy filed for mother’s insurance 
benefits for herself and child’s insurance benefits for the child, based on 
 
 224. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1185. 
 225. Id. at 1186 (citing Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 
2002)). 
 226. Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1110 n.32 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (citing Kabbaz v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007)). 
 227. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  The four embryos remaining from the original ten were not preserved.  Id. at 850 n.3. 
 231. Id. at 850. 
 232. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850–51. 
 233. Id. at 851. 
 234. Id. (alterations in original). 
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Wade’s earnings record.235  The SSA denied the claims both initially and on 
reconsideration.236  Although a Social Security ALJ issued a decision granting 
the benefits, the SSA’s Appeals Council reversed the ALJ.237 
Thereafter, Amy filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Arkansas,238 and that court certified the following question 
to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: “Does a child, who was created as an 
embryo through in vitro fertilization during his parents’ marriage, but 
implanted into his mother’s womb after the death of his father, inherit from the 
father under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child?”239  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative.240  The Arkansas 
intestacy statute provides: “Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived 
before his or her death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as 
if born in the lifetime of the intestate.”241 
Amy argued that her child was “conceived” when her egg was fertilized by 
Wade’s sperm in June 2001, a month before he died and was, therefore, not a 
posthumously conceived child.242  The SSA argued that the child “was neither 
born nor conceived during Amy and Wade’s marriage, which ended upon 
Wade’s death.”243 
The Arkansas Supreme Court decided not to decide the meaning of the 
term “conceived” under the statute.244  Instead the court reasoned that the 
Arkansas General Assembly “did not intend for the statute to permit a child, 
created through in vitro fertilization and implanted after the father’s death, to 
inherit under intestate succession” because the statute was enacted in 1969—
long before in vitro fertilization was developed.245 
This rationale is not terribly convincing.  It is akin to saying that the First 
Amendment does not apply to speech via radio, television, or the Internet, 
simply because those technologies did not exist when the Bill of Rights was 
adopted.  Equally unconvincing is the court’s discussion of the Arkansas Code 
provision addressing artificial insemination of a married woman.  The code 
states: “Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851. 
 238. Id. at 851. 
 239. Id. at 850. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 853 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (Supp. 2004)). 
 242. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 853. 
 245. Id. 853–54 (citing Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
275 (2006); Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, & Politics, 16 HEALTH 
MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 27 (2006)). 
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woman with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all 
purposes of intestate succession.  Consent of the husband is presumed unless 
the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.”246  The court 
reasoned that this provision was “inapposite” because it went to the legitimacy 
of a child and because it addressed artificial insemination rather than in vitro 
fertilization.247  But, unless legitimate children cannot take through intestacy 
under Arkansas law, then it is highly relevant that such a child is legitimate.  
Moreover, the statute evinces a broader legislative intent that children born 
through artificial reproductive technology between a married woman and her 
husband be treated as their legitimate offspring.  The court’s rationale suggests 
that had Wade’s sperm—rather than an embryo—been separately frozen and 
used after his death to artificially impregnate Amy, the resulting child would 
be legitimate and, presumably, could inherit, unlike the child here.  This 
appears to be, at best, a classic “distinction without a difference.” 
Given the serious problems with the court’s reasoning, it is encouraging 
that the opinion ended with a plea to the Arkansas General Assembly “to 
revisit the intestacy succession statutes to address the issues involved in the 
instant case and those that have not but will likely evolve.”248 
Despite the fact that the parties had previously agreed in the federal district 
court that the question to be certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court would be 
dispositive of the case, Amy nevertheless continued to pursue her claim in 
federal court.249  She argued that the Commissioner’s denial of benefits: “(1) 
violated her and her son’s rights to equal protection under the 5th and 14th 
Amendments; (2) failed to give full faith and credit to the February 14, 2003 
Order of the Lonoke County Circuit Court; and (3) was contrary to established 
law.”250 
Amy asserted two equal protection theories.251  First, she asserted that the 
decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Commissioner “created a 
whole new class of children who will be deprived of certain rights solely 
because they were not conceived and born in a ‘normal’ or ‘accepted’ 
manner.”252  Second, she asserted that the Social Security Act “deprives her of 
equal protection because it incorporates state intestacy law, which creates the 
possibility that claimants will be treated differently on a state-by-state 
basis.”253  Applying rational basis review,254 the court rejected both 
 
 246. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 854 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (Supp. 2004)). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 855. 
 249. Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1097–98 (E.D. Ark. 2009). 
 250. Id. at 1098. 
 251. Id. at 1099. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
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arguments.255  As to the first argument, the court found it rational for the state 
not to include as heirs for intestacy purposes children born months or even 
years after their father’s death; this reasonably related to “the orderly, timely, 
and final disposition of estate property.”256  As to the latter argument, the court 
found it rational for Congress to apply state intestacy law, citing authority that 
“there is no federal law of domestic relations.”257 
Next, the court readily rejected Amy’s full faith and credit argument.  The 
federal full faith and credit statute258 has been interpreted to “require[] federal 
courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive affect those judgments 
would be given in the courts of the states rendering them.”259  Here, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court had already ruled that Amy’s son could not inherit 
from his father’s estate despite the Lonoke County Court paternity 
judgment.260 
Amy’s third argument—that existing law supports an award of benefits—
largely relied on the decision in Gillett-Netting.261  The court easily disposed of 
this argument since Gillett-Netting was based on the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Arizona law, whereas Amy’s son could not inherit under 
Arkansas law as definitively construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.262 
H. Brandalynn Vernoff (California) 
California residents, Gabriela and Bruce Vernoff, had been married for 
five years when, in July 1995, Bruce suddenly died.263  At Gabriela’s direction, 
doctors extracted several sperm samples from Bruce’s cadaver.264  In June 
1998, almost three years after Bruce’s death, Gabriela underwent in vitro using 
Bruce’s sperm, which resulted in the March 1999 birth of a daughter, 
Brandalynn.265  Gabriela filed for child survivor benefits for Brandalynn, along 
with a claim for benefits for herself as Brandalynn’s mother.266  The SSA 
denied the claims, and a decade-long legal battle ensued.267  While the appeal 
was pending, the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Gillett-Netting, 
 
 255. Id. at 1104, 1106. 
 256. Id. at 1104. 
 257. Id. at 1105–06 (quoting De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)). 
 258. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
 259. Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista 
Energy, LLC, 458 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 1106–09. 
 262. Id. at 1109. 
 263. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
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which prompted a remand to the SSA to reconsider the claims in light of that 
decision and the SSA’s Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9) implementing that 
decision in all Ninth Circuit states, including California.268  The SSA 
reaffirmed its denial of the claims in 2006, and the district court upheld that 
denial in 2007.269 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Gabriela pressed both her statutory claims 
and an Equal Protection claim.270  But, the same court that had granted the 
Gillett-Netting claims applying Arizona domestic relations law denied the 
Vernoff claims under California law.271  The court noted that while Netting 
delayed his cancer treatment in order to deposit sperm for his wife’s later use 
and confirmed that he wanted her to use his sperm to have his child, there was 
no evidence of Bruce Vernoff’s consent to either the post-mortem harvesting 
of his sperm or its subsequent use by his widow to create a child.272 
In order for Brandalynn to establish her dependency on the insured, she 
needed to: 1) show actual dependency at the time of her father’s death; 2) 
satisfy the Gillett-Netting and SSAR requirements by “establishing that the 
insured is her ‘parent’ under California law and that she is, therefore, both 
legitimate and dependent”; or 3) demonstrate that she could inherit from the 
insured under California’s intestacy laws.273 
Obviously the first option was not available since Brandalynn was not 
conceived at the time of her father’s death.274 
The second option also was unavailable.  Under California law a man “is 
presumed to be the natural parent of a child, . . . if ‘[h]e and the child’s natural 
mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the 
marriage or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death.’”275  
Brandalynn was born over three and one-half years after Bruce Vernoff’s 
death.276  Bruce had neither received Brandalynn into his home and openly 
held her out as his child, nor had he acknowledged paternity.277  No basis 
existed under California law to establish Bruce as Brandalynn’s natural parent; 
indeed, “California law does not equate natural parent status with biological 
parenthood such that a mere biological relationship is sufficient” for natural 
 
 268. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.  See supra note 189 (discussing Gillett-Netting and the 
acquiescence ruling). 
 269. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105. 
 270. Id. at 1104. 
 271. Id. at 1112. 
 272. Id. at 1105. 
 273. Id. at 1106–07 (citing SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005)). 
 274. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107. 
 275. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a)).  But see In re Jerry P., 
116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding the underlying statute unconstitutional). 
 276. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107. 
 277. Id. at 1108. 
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parent status.278  The court emphasized the lack of consent on the part of 
Bruce, the deceased biological father, distinguishing this case from both 
Gillett-Netting and Woodward.279  Nor could Brandalynn meet the third option 
by demonstrating her ability to inherit from Bruce under the California Probate 
Code at the time of Bruce’s death.280 
Unable to demonstrate dependency, Gabriela finally argued that the SSA’s 
exclusion from benefits of certain posthumously conceived children—
including Brandalynn—violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.281  Relying on Matthews v. Lucas, the court applied rational basis 
review and, as in Lucas, found the denial of benefits rational.282  The court 
noted that only those children who do not meet the statutory requirements 
under California law are excluded, and “the challenged classifications are 
reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in limiting benefits to 
those children who have lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable 
presumptions to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on 
a case-by-case basis.”283 
I. B.E. Beeler (Iowa) 
The most recent in this line of cases involved an Iowa couple, Patti and 
Bruce Beeler.284  In November 2000, while they were engaged to be married, 
Bruce was diagnosed with leukemia.285  Bruce postponed chemotherapy 
treatments in order to bank sperm for Patti’s future use.286  He signed a form 
indicating, “In the event of my death, I wish to bequeath all my banked semen 
to my spouse/partner.”287  Bruce and Patti married in December 2000.288  
When Bruce reentered the hospital in January 2001, both he and Patti signed a 
second form expressing their desire that Patti be inseminated for the purpose of 
conceiving a child.289  The form also stated: “Male partner hereby agrees to 
accept and acknowledge paternity and child support responsibility of any 
resulting child or children.”290  Bruce died in May 2001, and Patti was 
 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1109–10. 
 280. Id. at 1110–12. 
 281. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1112. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Beeler v. Astrue, No. C09-0019, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 12, 2009). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 3–4.  Of three copies the laboratory’s version of this form indicated the bequest, as 
did one of two patient copies.  Id. at 4. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Beeler, No. C09-0019, at 4–5. 
 290. Id. at 5. 
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inseminated with his sperm in July 2002.291  A daughter, B.E.B., was born in 
April 2003, almost two years after Bruce’s death.292 
In June 2003, Patti filed for child’s insurance benefits on behalf of B.E.B., 
and the SSA denied that claim at all four administrative levels.293  In February 
2009, Patti sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Iowa.294  In a decision filed in November 2009, the 
Magistrate Judge reversed the SSA and directed an award of benefits to B.E.B. 
on Bruce’s account.295 
The critical issue before the court was whether B.E.B. was the child of the 
wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act.296  The 
Commissioner did not contest that B.E.B. was Bruce’s biological child.297  
Relying heavily on Gillett-Netting and the plain meaning of the statute, the 
court readily concluded that B.E.B. was Bruce’s child for the purposes of 
Social Security.298  Under that authority, a biological child is necessarily a 
“child” for SSA purposes.299  Hence, the court deemed it unnecessary to 
evaluate whether under Iowa law, B.E.B. was entitled to inherit from Bruce.300 
But, even if it were necessary for B.E.B. to demonstrate that she could 
inherit from Bruce under Iowa law, she would have met that burden.301  Under 
Iowa Code §633.222, a biological child will inherit from her father if either 
“(1) the evidence proving paternity is available during the father’s lifetime, or 
(2) the child has been recognized by the father as his child.”302  Relying on 
Iowa decisional law, the court found that the two forms signed by Bruce, in 
combination, satisfied the second part of the test, recognition by the father.303 
Finally, the court found that while not actually dependent on Bruce at the 
time of his death, B.E.B. was “deemed dependent” on Bruce because under 
Iowa law she was his legitimate child.304  Under Iowa Code § 252A.3(4), a 
child born to parents who were married “at any time prior or subsequent to the 
birth of such a child” is the legitimate child of both parents.305  B.E.B. met this 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 2. 
 294. Beeler, No. C09-0019, at 2. 
 295. Id. at 19. 
 296. Id. at 3. 
 297. Id. at 8.  In fact, DNA testing showed over a 99% probability that Bruce was B.E.B.’s 
biological father.  Id. at 5 n.11. 
 298. Id. at 8. 
 299. Beeeler, No. C09.0019, at 10. 
 300. Id. at 11. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 12 (quoting IOWA CODE § 633.222 (2007)). 
 303. Id. at 12–14. 
 304. Beeeler, No. C09.0019, at 11. 
 305. Id. at 17 (quoting IOWA CODE § 252A.3(4)). 
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standard.  Furthermore, because Bruce acknowledged in writing that any child 
born to Patti using his sperm would be his child, B.E.B. was also deemed 
dependent on Bruce under the Social Security Act.306 
As the court concluded that B.E.B. was Bruce’s legitimate child and she 
was entitled to benefits on his account; and even if she were not his legitimate 
child under state law, she would nonetheless be deemed dependent on Bruce at 
the time of his death, and hence eligible for child’s insurance benefits. 
III.  THE (SOMETIMES) NEBULOUS FAMILY LAW STATUS OF CHILDREN OF 
SAME-SEX COUPLES 
As the above discussion makes clear, the eligibility of a child conceived by 
non-traditional means for Social Security benefits on a parent’s account 
implicates a complex interplay of state and federal law, leading to varying 
results depending on the specific facts of the case and the state of the child’s 
birth.  Applying the restrictions of DOMA to children born to—or adopted 
by—one member of a same-sex couple adds legal complexity to the potential 
detriment of such children. 
Where a child is the natural or adopted child of one member of a same-sex 
couple and is adopted under state law by the partner of the parent, there should 
be no question about that child’s eligibility to claim Social Security benefits on 
the account of the adoptive parent.307  Likewise, where both members of a 
same-sex couple adopt a child who is not the biological child of either partner, 
that child should unquestionably be treated as the legal child of each adopting 
parent for Social Security purposes.308  In this regard, it is noteworthy that a 
number of states that do not permit same-sex couples to enter into marriage or 
legally recognized quasi-marital relationships such as civil unions, 
nevertheless, allow them to adopt each other’s child or a third-party child.309 
The difficulty occurs where a child being raised by a same-sex couple is 
neither the natural nor the adoptive child of one (or both) of them.  Thorny 
issues have arisen around the United States in the family law context where a 
child has been raised by a same-sex couple who later separate and the 
biological parent then tries to prevent her ex-partner from having a further 
relationship with the child.310  State courts have been divided as to whether the 
 
 306. Id. at 18–19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) (2006)). 
 307. 20 C.F.R. § 404.356 (2009). 
 308. Id. 
 309. For example, Pennsylvania has a state DOMA prohibiting same-sex marriage and the 
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages.  23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102, 1704 (West 
1996).  Nevertheless, Pennsylvania has recognized the ability of same-sex couples to adopt for 
almost a decade.  In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202–03 (Pa. 2002).  See also, e.g., 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing that Vermont allowed same-sex 
couples to adopt long before the litigation that led to civil unions). 
 310. See infra notes 315–31 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
842 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:811 
former partner who is neither a biological nor adoptive parent has any legal 
rights (or duties) vis-à-vis the child.311 
The cases are, quite properly, heavily fact-based.  Some courts have found 
such a former partner to lack standing to assert visitation rights.312  Other 
courts have granted the former partner rights using equitable doctrines 
including “in loco parentis” or “de facto parent” standing.313 
A. Custody and Visitation Issues 
In one Pennsylvania case, Jones v. Jones, the court ultimately awarded 
primary physical custody to the “nonbiological”—and non-adoptive—
parent.314  Two women, Patricia and Ellen, lived together as a lesbian couple in 
Pennsylvania, starting in 1988.315  They could not enter into a same-sex 
marriage or state-recognized quasi-marital relationship under Pennsylvania 
law, nor did the record indicate that they did so out-of-state.316  An anonymous 
sperm donor was utilized, and Ellen gave birth to twin boys in December 
1996.317  The parties lived together until January 2001, when Ellen left their 
residence, taking the twins with her.318  The trial judge granted primary 
physical custody to Ellen, the biological mother, awarding Patricia “relatively 
typical partial custody visitation rights.”319  However, after Ellen engaged in “a 
multi-year effort to exclude [Patricia] from the children’s lives” and “tried in 
every way possible to sabotage [Patricia’s] relationship with the children,” the 
trial court moved primary physical custody of the children to Patricia, their 
“non-biological mother.”320  On appeal, Ellen argued that this was error, inter 
alia because the trial judge had not found her to be unfit.321  But, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the trial court.322  While the evidentiary 
 
 311. See infra notes 315, 328, 333 and accompanying text. 
 312. See, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008) (finding no standing to 
sue for visitation rights as de facto parent).  Cf. Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498–99 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to acknowledge partner as de facto parent, but acknowledging standing 
as “person of legitimate interest” with burden of showing unfitness of biological parent). 
 313. See, e.g., SooHoo v. Johnson (In re SooHoo), 731 N.W.2d 815, 822, 826 (Minn. 2007) 
(in loco parentis); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (de facto); In re M.K.S.-V., 
301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (finding partner had standing to seek conservatorship). 
 314. Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 912 A.2d 838 
(Pa. 2006). 
 315. Id. at 917. 
 316. See supra note 309. 
 317. Jones, 884 A.2d at 917. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 918–19. 
 321. Id. at 916. 
 322. Jones, 884 A.2d at 919. 
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scales were tipped hard in favor of a parent in custody litigation, she did not 
actually have to be shown to be unfit in order for the non-parent to prevail.323 
In other situations, courts have deemed the former partner to be the legal 
parent of the other partner’s biological child by virtue of the state-recognized 
legal relationship—or former relationship—between the two partners.  
Unquestionably, the most notorious of these cases is the bitter and long-
running Miller-Jenkins interstate custody battle between Lisa Miller and her 
former partner, Janet Jenkins.324  While residing in Virginia, Miller and 
Jenkins entered into a “civil union” in Vermont.325  Miller was subsequently 
artificially inseminated and gave birth to a child, Isabella, in April 2002 while 
they still lived in Virginia.326  In August 2002, the couple relocated to Vermont 
where they raised Isabella together until September 2003, when Miller moved 
back to Virginia, taking Isabella with her.327  Miller initially filed in Vermont 
to dissolve the civil union, asking the court to award her primary custody and 
requesting that the court award Jenkins parent-child contact.328  She later did a 
complete about-face and filed in Virginia, asking the Virginia court to declare 
that Jenkins had no parental rights.329 
Meanwhile, in the ongoing Vermont litigation, the Vermont court held that 
Jenkins had parental rights vis-à-vis Isabella by virtue of the Vermont Civil 
Union law.330  When the Virginia trial court ruled that Jenkins had no parental 
or visitation rights, a direct interstate conflict was created.331 
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the 
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) barred the Virginia trial 
court from exercising jurisdiction over the custody claim.332  The court of 
appeals rejected the natural mother’s claim that DOMA somehow superseded 
the PKPA with regard to children of same-sex couples.333  As in the 
Pennsylvania case of Jones v. Jones, the Vermont trial court ultimately ordered 
primary custody to be changed from the natural mother to the non-biological 
mother, after it became clear that the natural mother would ignore visitation 
 
 323. Id. at 918.  Interestingly, the Superior Court referred to Patricia in different parts of its 
opinion as a “non-biological parent” and as a “third party” who was a “non-parent.”  Id. at 916, 
918. 
 324. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008); Miller-Jenkins v. 
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006). 
 325. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 957 (Vt. 2006). 
 331. See id. 
 332. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332. 
 333. Id. at 336. 
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orders and prevent the non-biological mother from having a relationship with 
the child.334 
B. Support Issues 
In addition to the troubling question of whether a non-adopting, former 
same-sex partner of a parent has parental rights vis-à-vis the child, there is the 
additional question of whether that former partner has a financial obligation to 
the child under state law, which might satisfy the dependency requirement 
under the Social Security Act.  Under certain circumstances, a state court may 
impose liability for support on the former partner, either applying statutory 
law, common law, or equitable principles.335  If the state statute—whether a 
same-sex marriage act, civil union, or related law—provides for such liability, 
then it is a straightforward matter of statutory construction, assuming the 
parties had entered into such a legally recognized relationship.  But, if not, the 
questions become more complex, and the states are divided. 
In a 2001 case, D.R.M., the Washington Court of Appeals found that a 
woman had no liability to support the child of her same-sex former domestic 
partner.336  Anne and Kelly had lived together starting in 1992, but had “never 
attempted to marry, nor did they ever participate in any type of union 
ceremony or commitment ceremony.”337  The trial court, however, “found that 
the parties’ actions were consistent with a marriage.”338  They sought out 
medical assistance together with an aim toward having Kelly get pregnant by 
artificial insemination and give birth to a child that Anne would later adopt.339  
Kelly ultimately received artificial insemination treatments; Anne was present 
for the doctor’s appointments.340 
The treatments were successful, but before the women knew that Kelly 
was pregnant, their relationship fell apart.341  Kelly gave birth to a baby girl in 
June 1997.342  Anne made some voluntary support payments to Kelly both 
 
 334. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03, at 19 (Vt. Rutland Cnty. Fam. Ct. Nov. 
20, 2009), aff’d, 2010 Vt. 98 (Vt. 2010).  At this writing, the natural mother has not complied 
with the order to turn over custody, and the trial court has issued a warrant for her arrest.  See 
Arrest Warrant Issued in Lesbian Parent Custody Case, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://www.Advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/02/23/Arrest_Warrant_in_lesbian_parent_cus
tody_case/. 
 335. See Caroline P. Blair, Note, It’s More Than a One-Night Stand: Why a Promise to 
Parent Should Obligate a Former Lesbian Partner to Pay Child Support in the Absence of a 
Statutory Requirement, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465, 475 (2006). 
 336. State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 337. Id. at 890. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 890. 
 342. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] DOMA AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 845 
before and after the birth of the child.343  Kelly, however, did not go forward 
with efforts to arrange a co-parenting plan or adoption by Anne.344  When 
Kelly went on public assistance, the state sued Anne for support payment, and 
Kelly filed a separate action against Anne, which was consolidated for trial 
with the first action.345  The trial court denied relief in both actions, and the 
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.346 
The Court of Appeals recognized that a parent may be either biological or 
adoptive.347  Anne was neither.348  The court found no requirement under 
Washington law that a child have two parents.349  The court likewise rejected a 
duty of support based on theories of “intended parent,”350 estoppel,351 and 
breach of promise.352 
The following year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel to uphold a support duty placed on the non-adopting 
same-sex former partner of a lesbian mother.353  In the case of H.A.N. v. L.S.K., 
a lesbian couple had decided to have children together.354  L.S.K. ultimately 
had five children—a single child, followed by quadruplets—through artificial 
insemination by anonymous sperm donors.355  When the quadruplets were four 
years old, the parties separated and L.S.K. moved across the country with the 
children.356  Although she never adopted the children, H.A.N. sued L.S.K. for 
custodial rights; L.S.K. responded with a complaint against H.A.N. for child 
support.357  The two lawsuits proceeded down parallel tracks.  H.A.N. won 
shared legal and partial physical custody of the children while denying any 
obligation to support them.358  The trial court ruled that H.A.N. could not have 
it both ways: by her conduct she was estopped from claiming she was not 
liable for child support.359 
 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 890–91. 
 346. D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 891, 898. 
 347. Id. at 891. 
 348. Id. at 892. 
 349. Id. at 892. 
 350. Id. at 894. 
 351. D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 897. 
 352. Id. at 898. 
 353. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 877–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
 354. Id. at 874. 
 355. Id. at 874–75. 
 356. Id. at 875. 
 357. Id. at 874–75. 
 358. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 874–75. 
 359. Id. at 875–76. 
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, applying the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel.360  It found that unlike a stepparent who steps into the role 
of parent to pre-existing children, H.A.N. committed herself to a course of 
conduct with L.S.K. that brought these five children into being.361 
Yet another layer of complexity may be involved where a same-sex couple 
has a child using a known sperm donor or surrogate mother.  This gives rise to 
the possibility of more than two persons asserting parental rights, or having 
parental duties, toward the same child.  Such a scenario came to fruition in 
Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 2007.362  
Two Pennsylvania women, Jodilynn and Jennifer, had entered into a civil 
union in Vermont.363  Jodilynn had two children by a known sperm donor, 
Carl, who was involved with the children’s lives from their birth.364  After 
Jodilynn left the relationship, her former partner, Jennifer, commenced custody 
litigation which ultimately resulted in all three adults—Jodilynn, Jennifer and 
Carl—having various custodial rights toward the children.365  When Jodilynn 
sued Jennifer for child support, Jennifer did not deny liability but asked the 
trial court to join Carl as a party defendant who was also liable for child 
support since he was “essentially a third parent.”366  The trial court denied 
joinder, and Jennifer appealed.367 
The appellate court reversed, distinguishing the case from L.S.K. since in 
this case the lesbian ex-partner was not contesting her own child support 
liability and the natural father had voluntarily made significant financial 
contributions to the children already.368  However, the appellate court did apply 
one principle from L.S.K. to the case: estoppel.369  Since Carl had custodial 
rights based on his biological parenthood, it would be fundamentally unfair for 
him to disclaim financial responsibility.370  The result—apparently unique in 
 
 360. Id. at 877–78.  Estoppel applies to “prevent[] one from asserting a claim or right that 
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004). 
 361. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 877. 
 362. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 363. Id. at 476. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476. 
 368. Id. at 480–82. 
 369. Id. at 480. 
 370. Id. at 480. 
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the law of the United States371—was three individuals with parental rights and 
responsibilities.372 
The Jacob decision leads directly to the possibility that the SSA could be 
obligated to pay survivor’s benefits to a child if any one of three parental 
figures were to die, surely a thought that would alarm any SSA actuary.  
Indeed, in an ironic twist, Carl died before the appellate decision was 
announced, and apparently the children began receiving Social Security 
survivor’s benefits on his account.373 
IV.  DOMA’S IMPACT ON NON-BIOLOGICAL, NON-ADOPTED CHILDREN OF 
ONE MEMBER OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
DOMA has compelled the SSA to confront the issue of whether a non-
biological and non-adoptive child of a person who is, or has been, a member of 
a same-sex couple may be eligible for survivor’s or disability benefits on the 
account of that parental figure where the parent-child relationship is 
established by a state same-sex marriage (or quasi-marriage) law.  For 
example, in the bitter Vermont-Virginia interstate custody battle between Lisa 
Miller and Janet Jenkins, the Vermont courts declared Isabella to be the legal 
child of her non-biological, non-adopting parent by virtue of Vermont’s (now 
superseded) Civil Union law.374  Normally, if a parent with an adequate Social 
Security earnings record becomes disabled, her child will be entitled to 
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act as an 
“auxiliary beneficiary.”375  And, as discussed in Parts I and II, if that parent 
dies, her dependent child will be entitled to survivor’s benefits.376  But, if the 
parent-child relationship is created by a state’s same-sex marriage (or quasi-
marriage) law, would payment of benefits to the child contravene DOMA’s 
mandate that for all federal purposes, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or 
wife?”377  The federal government has given inconsistent answers to this 
question and, to date, it is not clearly resolved. 
 
 371. However, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Canada, has reached a similar result in A.A. 
v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2 (CanLII). 
 372. For an in-depth analysis of Jacob, see Robert E. Rains, Case Commentary, Three 
Parents?, 20 DENNING L.J. 197 (2008). 
 373. Id. at 204 n.48. 
 374. See supra notes 20, 324–34 and accompanying text. 
 375. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (2010).  While the term “auxiliary beneficiary” is not defined in this 
chapter, 20 C.F.R. Section 229.48 in the same title states “auxiliary beneficiary (spouse and 
children).”  Id. § 229.48(d). 
 376. Id. § 404.350.  See discussion supra Parts I, II. 
 377. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
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In July 2004, shortly after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that Massachusetts must permit same-sex marriage,378 the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) issued a Report for Congress entitled, “The Effect of 
State-Legalized Same-Sex Marriage on Social Security Benefits and 
Pensions.”379  That report, while not directly addressing the status of the child 
of a state-recognized same-sex marriage, made clear that DOMA requires that, 
“the legalization of same-sex marriage at the state level has no effect in 
determining the validity of marriage for Social Security purposes.”380 
If taken to its logical extension, the CRS Report would preclude benefits 
for the non-biological and non-adoptive child of a same-sex parent whose 
parental rights are based on legal recognition of a same-sex relationship.  
However, after the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in Miller-Jenkins 
in 2006 that the child born to one member of a civil union is the legal child of 
the other member, the SSA sought further guidance from the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) of the United States Justice Department.381  The resulting OLC 
opinion, issued in October 2007, found no preclusive effect mandated by 
DOMA: 
A child’s inheritance rights under state law may be independent of the 
existence of a marriage or spousal relationship, and that is indeed the case in 
Vermont.  Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in DOMA would prevent the 
non-biological child of a partner in a Vermont civil union from receiving CIB 
[child’s insurance benefits] under the Social Security Act.382 
The OLC opinion went on to apply this conclusion to a specific claim then 
pending before the SSA.  Two women, identified in the opinion as Karen and 
Monique, entered into a civil union in Vermont in 2002.383  Monique bore a 
son, Elijah, in 2003.384  Although Karen did not adopt Elijah, his birth 
certificate listed her as his “2nd parent;” other documents used the term “civil 
union parent.”385  In 2005, the SSA found Karen to be disabled and she filed 
for auxiliary benefits for Elijah as her dependent child.386 
 
 378. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
 379. LAURA HALTZEL & PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21897, THE 
EFFECT OF STATE-LEGALIZED SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AND 
PENSIONS (2004). 
 380. Id. at 2. 
 381. Whether the Defense of Marriage Act Precludes the Non-biological Child of a Member 
of a Vermont Civil Union from Qualifying for Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social 
Security Act, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 n.1 (2007) [hereinafter DOMA Preclusion]. 
 382. Id. at 1. 
 383. Id. at 2. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. DOMA Preclusion, supra note 381, at 2. 
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One interesting aspect of the OLC opinion is that it explicitly provided 
that, “[b]ecause Karen was domiciled in Vermont at the time of Elijah’s 
application, we look to Vermont law for guidance.”387  This suggests that a 
parent could potentially “game the system” by moving to a state like Vermont 
before filing an application for his or her child. 
Applying Vermont law to the issue of Elijah’s relationship with Karen, the 
OLC opinion readily concluded that, in light of Miller-Jenkins, “Vermont law 
would recognize Elijah as Karen’s child for purposes of his right to inherit, 
should she die intestate.”388 
The OLC opinion then turned to whether DOMA would bar SSA from 
recognizing that state-created relationship.  The OLC rather elliptically 
concluded that it would not. 
  By its terms, 1 U.S.C. § 7 does not apply to Elijah’s eligibility for CIB 
under the Social Security Act.  As discussed, Elijah’s eligibility arises out of 
his status as Karen’s “child” under section 416, and the law provides that he 
“shall be deemed such” simply because he “would have the same status 
relative to taking intestate personal property as a child” under Vermont law.  
That analysis does not require any interpretation of the words “marriage” or 
“spouse” under the Social Security Act or any other provision of federal law.  
Nor does the analysis even require interpreting those terms under Vermont law 
in a way that might have consequence for the administration of federal 
benefits.  An individual may qualify as a “child” under section 416 wholly 
apart from the existence of any marriage at all, as would be the case of a 
natural-born child of an unmarried couple, or, as is the case here, where 
Vermont recognizes a parent-child relationship outside the context of marriage.  
The fact that Elijah’s right of inheritance ultimately derives from Vermont’s 
recognition of a same-sex civil union is simply immaterial under DOMA.  
Accordingly, DOMA would not preclude Elijah from qualifying for CIB as a 
child of Karen under the Social Security Act.389 
Since the SSA had informed the OLC in advance that it would be bound by 
the OLC’s opinion,390 one might have thought the issue to have been resolved.  
But it was not. 
In late May 2008, Florida resident Gary Day sued the SSA through the 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the SSA to 
make a decision on his application for child’s insurance benefits, which he 
filed in February 2006 for his two children.391  In January 2008, the SSA had 
ruled that Day was disabled within the meaning of Title II of the Social 
 
 387. Id. at 3. 
 388. Id. at 3–4. 
 389. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). 
 390. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 391. Complaint at 1, 6, Day v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:08-CV-00896 (D.D.C. May 28, 2008). 
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Security Act with an onset date of June 23, 2003.392  Day was listed as a parent 
of each child on that child’s California birth certificate and had obtained orders 
from the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles 
establishing his parental rights as to each child.393  The Complaint rather 
obliquely asserted that “[n]either of the Judgments Establishing Parental Rights 
was based on any presumption in, nor operation of, California law respecting 
the relationship between Plaintiff Gary Day and any other adult person.”394 
In August 2008, the SSA issued an Emergency Message Policy Instruction 
to its internal units, citing the October 2007 OLC opinion and directed that if a 
claim is made for auxiliary benefits for a child, the claim must be submitted for 
a legal opinion to the Regional Chief Counsel, “if the NH (Number Holder) is 
not the biological parent and a parental relationship is alleged based upon . . . a 
same-sex marriage, civil union, or other legal relationship, such as a domestic 
partnership.”395  Some eight months later, in April 2009, the SSA sent a letter 
to Gary Day’s attorneys indicating that the SSA would award child’s benefits 
to his children.396  This good news for the children arrived three years and 
three months after Day filed the applications for benefits for them. 
V.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS 
No matter what one’s views on DOMA and same-sex relationships and, for 
that matter, the creation of children by such nontraditional methods as post-
mortem conception, it is past time for both the state and federal governments to 
directly address these matters through a child-centered approach.  Continuing 
to evade legislative responsibility at the state and federal levels has not 
stopped—and will not stop—children from being conceived through non-
traditional means and being born into non-traditional families.  Punishing such 
children by denying them benefits to which other children would be entitled 
may save small amounts of public money, but it is hardly sound public policy.  
Nor would recognizing the rights of such children likely “open the floodgates” 
to a massive raid on the public fisc.  The following proposals flow from these 
principles: 
 
 392. Id. at 6. 
 393. Id. at 4, 5. 
 394. Id. at 5.  While those judgments are not attached to the Complaint, it is a reasonable 
inference that the children were the result of a surrogacy arrangement in California using Day’s 
partner’s sperm. 
 395. SSA EM-08080 (Aug. 1, 2008). 
 396. See Erin Baer, Social Security Administration to Provide Benefits in Lambda Legal Case 
Representing Gay Father’s Children, LAMBDA LEGAL (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.lambda 
legal.org/news/pr/pr_ssa-to-provide-benefits-in-lambda-legal-case-representing-gay-fathers-
children.html. 
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1. Congress should amend DOMA397 to provide that it shall not be 
construed to deny benefits to children who are the legal or equitable children of 
wage earners. 
2. State legislatures should amend their parentage laws to provide that 
where two adults take—or cause to have taken—medical steps with the 
intention of creating a child that they intend to raise, they are both the legal 
parents of the resulting child or children with full parental rights and 
responsibilities.398 
3. State legislatures should enact provisions akin to Article 8 of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (2000),399 providing for the ability to have surrogacy 
agreements approved by a court before conception, with the court entering an 
order at that time identifying the legal parents of any child resulting from the 
surrogacy.400 
4. Finally, in all cases where the legal choice is between a minor child 
having one legal parent or two, all doubts should be resolved in favor of there 
being two adults with legal rights and responsibilities toward that child.401  
And, if that means that the child would become eligible for Social Security 
benefits on the second parent’s earnings record, that is a price that we, as a 
society, should be collectively willing to pay. 
  
 
 397. This Article purposefully takes no position on whether DOMA should be repealed in 
whole or in part, but simply assumes it will remain federal law. 
 398. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1412–
13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that former husband and wife who had entered into a surrogacy 
agreement using donor sperm were legal parents of resulting child who was not biologically 
related to either of them). 
 399. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362–69 (Supp. 
2010). 
 400. See generally Rains, supra note 108, at 34. 
 401. This position is contrary to that taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ferguson v. 
McKiernan, where the court found a known sperm donor to a separated and later divorced woman 
to have no legal responsibilities to the resulting child.  Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 
1242, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (enforcing a non-parentage agreement between donor and birth mother). 
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